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Hall v. Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of Invasion
of Privacy by Truthful Publication of Embarrassing Facts
The first amendment rights to free speech and free press necessarily conflict
with the desire to prevent or to provide compensation for harmful expression.
The conflict is most acute when truthful speech hurts, because stopping the
harm requires silencing truth. In close cases concerning harmful publication by
the media, North Carolina historically has deferred to free press interests and
denied some tort claims recognized in other states.I The North Carolina
Supreme Court continued that tradition in 1988 by refusing to recognize the tort
of invasion of privacy by publication of private facts. The court in Hall v. Post,2
in contrast to the majority of state courts, 3 rejected the private facts tort because
of its potential conflict with the first amendment.4 The decision is unprece-
dented. It grants more protection to truthful speech than the United States
Supreme Court thus far has required under the Constitution5 and more than any
other state court has chosen to provide in common law. 6
The court in Hall patterned its reasoning after an earlier decision rejecting
another privacy tort, false light,7 because it threatened free press protected by
the first amendment and partially duplicated the tort of libel.8 The Hall court
reasoned that the private facts tort was likewise constitutionally suspect and that
such a claim might be actionable under the established tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.9 The court expressly withheld, however, any assur-
ance that a factually similar claim made under an established tort label would
not also amount to an unacceptable encroachment on free press.10
This Note analyzes the Hall decision and the new rule it establishes for
North Carolina,11 comparing the rule with those in other states.12 The Note
discusses the free speech implications of the private facts tort and concludes that
1. See, e.g., Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 323, 312 S.E.2d 405,
412, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) (rejecting false light privacy tort); Stutts v. Duke Power Co.,
47 N.C. App. 76, 82, 266 S.E.2d 861, 865 (1980) (denying relief for libel per quod in the absence of
pecuniary loss).
2. 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988).
3. See Kovner, Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light, and Commerciali-
zation Claims in 2 PRACTICING LA\V INSTITUTE, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 289, 304, 326 (1983)
(survey of decisions); Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. Rlv. 291, 365-67 (1983) (listing 36 states that have recognized the
"private-facts" tort).
4. Hall, 323 N.C. at 265, 372 S.E.2d at 714; see U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 57 U.S.L.W. 4816, 4820 (U.S. June 21, 1989); Hall, 323 N.C. at 265,
372 S.E.2d at 715 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)); see infra notes
85-94 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
8. See Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 323, 312 S.E.2d 405, 412,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
9. Hall, 323 N.C. at 268-69, 372 S.E.2d at 716-17.
10. Id. at 269, 372 S.E.2d at 717.
11. See infra notes 153-59 & 171-72 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 102-32 and accompanying text.
the court in Hall made a constitutionally wise decision, even though the United
States Supreme Court has not yet required such general protection of truthful
speech under the first amendment. 13 The Note also discusses the potential alter-
native claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress mentioned by the Hall
court, proposing that only intentional infliction of emotional distress motivated
by actual ill will toward the plaintiff should be without first amendment protec-
tion. This Note concludes that even this narrowly defined tort may be constitu-
tionally suspect, and ultimately more trouble than it is worth.
Hall v. Post began with the kind of human interest story small town news-
paper reporters relish: Ex-Carny Seeks Baby Abandoned 17 Years Ago.14
Aledith Gottschalk had passed through Salisbury, North Carolina in 1967 as
part of a carnival crew.' 5 She allowed her husband to leave their four-month-
old daughter with a babysitter indefinitely. 16 Mrs. Gottschalk returned to Salis-
bury in July, 1984 to search for the child, not knowing where her daughter was
or what her name could be. 17 She did remember that the babysitter's name was
Mary Hall. I8 An interview published in The Salisbury Post attracted telephone
calls to a motel room where Mrs. Gottschalk and her second husband were stay-
ing.19 As a result, they found Mrs. Gottschalk's daughter, who had been
renamed Susie Hall, and the girl's adoptive mother, Mary Hall.20 The newspa-
per promptly followed up with a front-page article identifying the daughter and
her adoptive family by name and address and describing an emotional telephone
conversation between the Gottschalks and Mrs. Hall.2 1 Humiliated by the arti-
cles, Mary and Susie Hall fled their home to escape any further public atten-
tion.22 They later sought psychiatric treatment for alleged mental and
emotional distress. 23
Mary and Susie Hall sued The Salisbury Post and the reporter who covered
the story for invasion of privacy by publication of private, embarrassing facts. 24
13. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 57 U.S.L.W. 4816, 4818 (U.S. June 20, 1989); infra text accom-
panying notes 180-82.
14. Salisbury Post, July 18, 1984, at IA, col. 1; see Hall, 323 N.C. at 261, 372 S.E.2d at 712.
15. Hall, 323 N.C. at 261, 372 S.E.2d at 712.
16. Id.
17. Id. Mrs. Gottschalk had lived all her life on a Wisconsin farm until 1966, when, at age 24,
she married a carnival worker she had met at a fair in Wausau. Ex-Carney Seeks Baby Abandoned
17 Years Ago, Salisbury Post, July 18, 1984, at IA, col. 1. Her husband left their child with the
babysitter in Salisbury and told his wife they would return for the child within a few weeks. Hall,
323 N.C. at 261, 372 S.E.2d at 712. He eventually said he had signed papers authorizing the baby
girl's adoption. Id. The couple later divorced, and the wife remarried, taking the name Gottschalk.
She was accompanied by her new husband when she returned to Salisbury. Id.
18. See Ex-Carney Seeks Baby Abandoned 17 Years Ago, Salisbury Post, July 18, 1984, at 12A,
col. 3.
19. Hall, 323 N.C. at 261, 372 S.E.2d at 712.
20. Id.
21. Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. 610, 613, 355 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1987), rev'd, 323 N.C. 259, 372
S.E.2d 711 (1988); Daughter Found, Mom Hopes for Reunion, Salisbury Post, July 20, 1984, at IA,
col. 1.
22. Hall, 323 N.C. at 261, 372 S.E.2d at 712.
23. Id. at 261-62, 372 S.E.2d at 712.
24. Id. at 262, 372 S.E.2d at 713. Plaintiffs also alleged invasion of privacy by intrusion on
solitude and seclusion, but the trial court and both appellate courts held that the facts did not sup-
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They cited a state statute requiring that adoption records be kept confidential. 25
The trial judge granted summary judgment for defendant newspaper. 26
A panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the
trial court, holding that plaintiffs had established a private facts claim.27 The
North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently reversed the court of appeals. 28
Although defendants argued that the disclosed facts were of legitimate public
concern and were not sufficiently private to establish the invasion of privacy tort
if it were recognized,29 the supreme court chose to preclude the claim as a more
general matter of law.30 The majority declared that the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy by publication of private facts would not be recognized in North Carolina
because it threatened free expression protected by the first amendment and over-
lapped an already recognized tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress. 3t
Justice Mitchell, writing for the majority, explained that when a truthful
publication is alleged to have caused harm, "'claims of privacy most directly
confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.' "32 He noted that the
United States Supreme Court has yet to decide "'whether truthful publications
may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.' 33 The court expressed concern that the private
facts tort was constitutionally suspect, noting that the origin of the tort predated
the application of the first amendment to the states.3 4 The court drew a distinc-
tion between the constitutional right to privacy from governmental intrusion
and the common-law right to privacy from nongovernmental intrusion. 35 It
concluded that when no constitutional privacy right is at stake, "a reasonable
argument certainly can be made that the First Amendment rights of speech and
press control and prohibit recovery ... for [publication of] the truth."'36
The Hall decision ultimately relied not upon the first amendment but upon
the state supreme court's authority to define common law. The court, by anal-
port an intrusion claim. Id. The intrusion tort normally consists of a physical or sensory intrusion,
such as trespassing, wiretapping, or eavesdropping. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
comment b (1977).
25. See Plaintiff's Brief at 8, Hall (No. 8627SC1012) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (1984)).
26. Hall, 85 N.C. App. at 611, 355 S.E.2d at 821.
27. Id. at 623, 355 S.E.2d at 828. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on plain-
tiffs' claim of invasion of privacy by intrusion because the facts showed no "physical or sensory
interference with, or prying into, a person's solitude or seclusion or his private affairs." Id. at 615,
355 S.E.2d at 823. The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals on that issue and did not
discuss it further. See Hall, 323 N.C. at 262, 372 S.E.2d at 713.
28. Hall, 323 N.C. at 260, 372 S.E.2d at 712. The court considered the case after granting
defendant's petition for discretionary review. Hall v. Post, 320 N.C. 512, 358 S.E.2d 519 (1987)
(granting discretionary review).
29. Defendants' Brief at 17-25, Hall (No. 340PA87).
30. Hall, 323 N.C. at 269-70, 372 S.E.2d at 717.
31. Id. at 268-69, 372 S.E.2d at 716-17.
32. Id. at 267, 372 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491
(1975)).
33. Id. at 265, 372 S.E.2d at 715 (quoting Cox, 420 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added)).
34. Id. at 262, 372 S.E.2d at 713.
35. Id. at 266, 372 S.E.2d at 715.
36. Id.
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ogy, followed its 1984 ruling in Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co. ,37
which rejected another privacy tort, the claim against publicity placing a person
in a false light.38 In Hall Justice Mitchell echoed his majority opinion in Ren-
wick, reasoning that the elements of the private facts tort substantially over-
lapped those for other torts already recognized in North Carolina, 39 particularly
intentional infliction of emotional distress.4° The court expressly declined, how-
ever, to decide "whether any other tort is constitutional or cognizable at law
upon facts such as those presented here."'4 1
Although concurring in the Hall result, two justices refused to join the ma-
jority's opinion.42 The concurring justices would have allowed the tort of inva-
sion of privacy by publication of private facts in a proper case, but not under the
facts of Hall.4 3 Justice Frye wrote, "I do not believe that the media should be
given a license to pry into the private lives of ordinary citizens and spread before
the public highly offensive but very private facts without any degree of accounta-
bility."44 He noted that nearly every state, including North Carolina, has recog-
nized some type of privacy tort.45 He reasoned that the Restatement's
requirement that plaintiffs prove that the publication of private facts was both
offensive and not of legitimate public concern, 46 combined with the trial court's
ability to decide those issues as a matter of law on a summary judgment motion,
would protect first amendment rights sufficiently.47
North Carolina's treatment of the private facts tort in Hall is best under-
stood in the context of the tort's development in other states and its impact on
first amendment concerns recognized by the United States Supreme Court. The
private facts tort is a distinctively American invention. 48 It was proposed in
37. 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984). For a discussion of Ren-
wick, see infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
38. Hall, 323 N.C. at 265, 372 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Renwick).
39. Hall, 323 N.C. at 267, 372 S.E.2d at 716. The court in Renwick rejected the false light tort
in part because its elements overlapped those for libel. See Renwick, 310 N.C. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at
412.
40. Hall, 323 N.C. at 269, 372 S.E.2d at 717. Other torts that the court said "possibly" could
be duplicated by the private facts tort were trespass and intrusive invasion of privacy. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 270, 372 S.E.2d at 717 (Frye, J., concurring). Justice Meyer joined in Justice Frye's
concurrence.
43. Id. at 279, 372 S.E.2d at 722 (Frye, J., concurring). Justice Frye opined that a reasonable
juror could not have found that the details of the Post articles were not of legitimate public concern
under the Restatement standards. Id. (Frye, J. concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 653D comment h (1977)).
44. Id. at 270, 372 S.E.2d at 717 (Frye, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 271, 372 S.E.2d at 718 (Frye, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 275, 372 S.E.2d at 720 (Frye, J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D (1977)). The elements of this tort and standards for proving them are discussed infra
text accompanying notes 57-60.
47. Hall, 323 N.C. at 275, 372 S.E.2d at 720 (Frye, J., concurring). Justice Frye's reasoning is
slightly less generous than the court of appeals' assertion that the determination whether the facts
published were of legitimate public concern is an issue particularly suited for jury review. See Hall,
85 N.C. App. at 620, 355 S.E.2d at 826 (1987), rev'd, 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988).
48. See Hall, 323 N.C. at 262-64, 372 S.E.2d at 713-14 (private facts tort never has been recog-
nized in England or in other countries following English common law); D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND
THE PRESS 18 (1972) (suggesting that transformed social environment in the United States in 1890s
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
1890 by Samuel D. Warren and (later United States Supreme Court Justice)
Louis D. Brandeis in perhaps the most famous of all law review articles, The
Right to Privacy.4 9 According to Warren and Brandeis, the truth of facts publi-
cized would be no defense to a private facts claim, because the right to privacy
they identified was "not merely the right to prevent inaccurate portrayal of pri-
vate life, but to prevent its being depicted at all." 50
The Warren and Brandeis thesis was not accepted quickly. The first state
appellate court thereafter to consider a privacy claim rejected the theory,5' and
other state courts and legislatures did not begin to recognize the tort until the
early twentieth century. 52 Eventually, a majority of state courts presented with
private facts claims recognized the tort.5 3 In addition to the private facts tort,
state courts have recognized three other invasions of the common-law right to
privacy: unreasonable intrusion upon one's seclusion in a physical area, appro-
priation of one's name or image for commercial use, and publicity that unrea-
sonably places one in a false light.54 Although the United States Supreme Court
has recognized a fourth and fourteenth amendment due process right against
invasion of privacy by the government, 55 the Court consistently has distin-
guished this constitutional right from the common-law right to privacy from
other people.5 6
helped spur creation of the tort); Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 307 (English common law, Roman
law, and Biblical law forbade only false free speech).
49. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). "Instantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life," the authors lamented. Id. at 195. "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency.... When personal gossip attains the dignity of print.., it
usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things." Id. at 196. Although the article drew
analogies to the law of copyright, id. at 206-07, contract, id. at 207, and trade secrets, id. at 212, the
authors emphasized that the right to privacy "is in reality not the principle of private property, but
that of an inviolate personality." Id. at 205.
The Warren and Brandeis article has been called "perhaps the outstanding illustration of the
influence of legal periodicals upon the courts." W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
50. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 49, at 218.
51. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 544, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902) (deny-
ing "the claim that a man has a right to pass through this world ... without having his picture
published, his business enterprises discussed ... or his eccentricities commented upon ... whether
the comment be favorable or otherwise").
52. Commentators cite Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905), as the first decision recognizing the common-law right to privacy. See, e.g., D. PEMBEIR,
supra note 48, at 70-71. The Pavesich court recognized a privacy claim when a photograph of plain.
tiff, a private person, and a false statement that plaintiff had bought a life insurance policy from
defendant was published in a newspaper advertisement. Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 220-22, 50 S.E. at 81.
The court also held that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for libel. Id. Although Pavesich
typically is cited by courts allowing the private facts tort, its greater similarity to the misappropria-
tion branch of the privacy torts rarely has been acknowledged. For a discussion of cases and statutes
following Pavesich, see D. PEMBER, supra note 48, at 72-76.
53. Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 365-66 (citing 36 jurisdictions that recognize the private facts
tort).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, 652C, 652E (1977).
55. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
56. See, eg., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (no fourth amendment viola-
tion when Federal Express manager opened package containing cocaine). But see Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 414-15 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (equating a general right to privacy with fourth
and fourteenth amendment rights to privacy from government). One commentator has written,
1478 [Vol. 67
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The private facts tort as defined in the Restatement and most jurisdictions
contains three elements: (1) giving publicity, 57 (2) to facts that a reasonable
person would consider private and highly offensive if exposed, 58 and (3) that are
not of legitimate public concern. 59 The Restatement requires that the public
concern addressed by the third element of the tort be legitimate: "account must
be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last anal-
ysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores." 6 The Restate-
ment also issues a special note of caution: "It has not been established with
certainty that liability of this nature is consistent with the free-speech and free-
press provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution, as applied to state
law through the Fourteenth Amendment.
6 1
The historical evidence suggests that the framers of the first amendment would have
viewed restraints imposed by tort law on accurate speech-to the extent that they consid-
ered the matter at all-as inappropriate, and that the embarrassment that might result
from true revelations was not considered a legal or compensable wrong.
Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 311.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The publicity element differs from the
publication element in defamation cases in that publicity requires that the facts be communicated
not merely to a third person, but to the public at large. Id. comment a. Warren and Brandeis made
a parallel distinction between oral and written publication, explaining that "[the injury resulting
from such oral communications would ordinarily be so trifling that the law might well, in the inter-
est of free speech, disregard it altogether." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 49, at 217 n.4. One
commentator has noted that this element "targets the mass media for liability... [and] suggests that
in this area the press has significantly less freedom of speech than does a private individual." Zim-
merman, supra note 3, at 300-01.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Whether a fact is so private that pub-
licizing it is offensive is open to interpretation. The Restatement cites sexual relations, family quar-
rels, humiliating illnesses, and some details of a person's past "that he would rather forget" as
examples of private facts. Id. § 652B comment b. The Restatement suggests that a person has a right
to prevent disclosure of facts that he "keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family
or to close personal friends." Id. The Restatement finds a publication offensive if "a reasonable
person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it." Id. § 652B comment c. Examples of
offensive publicity are publication of a photograph without her consent of a mother nursing her child
or of a woman giving birth by caesarian operation. Id. § 652B illustrations 10 & 11.
59. Id. § 652D. The public concern element is also subject to interpretation. The Restate-
ment's broad definition includes "matters of genuine, even if... deplorable, popular appeal," id.
§ 652B comment g, and "the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for
purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment." Id. § 652B comment j. Commentary to the
Restatement explains that the drafters understood the Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting
Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), to indicate that "common law restrictions on recovery for public-
ity given to a matter of proper public interest will now become a part of the constitutional law of
freedom of the press and freedom of speech." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D com-
ment d (1977). Even Warren and Brandeis conceded that "privacy does not prohibit any publication
of matter which is of public or general interest." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 49, at 214.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment h (1977). No legitimate public con-
cern exists when publicity "becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own
sake, with which a reasonable member of the public with decent standards, would say he had no
concern." Id.
61. Id. § 652D special note. The first state court decision recognizing a privacy tort after the
Warren and Brandeis article, but preceding the first amendment's application to the states, empha-
sized that the public concern exemption was necessary to protect free speech. Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 204, 50 S.E. 68, 74 (1905). The Georgia Supreme Court
explained:
The right of privacy is unquestionably limited by the right to speak and print. It may be
said that to give liberty of speech and of the press such wide scope as has been indicated
would impose a very serious limitation upon the right to privacy; but if it does, it is due to
the fact that the law considers that the welfare of the public is better subserved by main-
taining the liberty of speech and of the press than by allowing an individual to assert his
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The United States Supreme Court has resolved conflicts between the right
to privacy and the right of free press by analogy to defamation cases. The
Supreme Court first addressed the conflict between privacy and free press in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 62 a false light case holding that false but nondefamatory pub-
licity about private persons in an event of public interest must be protected to
the same degree as defamatory false speech about a public official. 63 In Time
plaintiff family brought a false light privacy claim against defendant magazine
when their ordeal as hostages erroneously was reported to have been reenacted
in a Broadway play.64 Although the magazine article did not defame plaintiffs,
it inaccurately portrayed their ordeal. 65 The Court held that plaintiffs had to
prove the article was published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
the truth-the "actual malice" standard established three years earlier in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 66 for a public official presenting a libel claim. 67 The
plurality opinion in Time declared that "guarantees for speech and press are not
the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs."'68 Further-
more, "'[tihe line ... between ... informing and ... entertaining is too elusive
for the protection of the free press.' ",69 The Court explained that a stringent
fault standard is particularly necessary to protect the publisher of nondefama-
tory facts because "the content of the speech itself affords no warning of pro-
spective harm to another through falsity." 70 The plurality left open the question
whether newsworthy disclosures would be immune from liability if "'so inti-
mate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the com-
munity's notions of decency.' "71 Two Justices concurred in the Time decision,
but insisted that the first amendment should protect free speech absolutely.72
Three dissenters equated the right to privacy against the press with the fourth
right of privacy in such a way as to interfere with the free expression of one's sentiments
and the publication of every matter in which the public may be legitimately interested.
Id. One commentator has referred to this as "the newsworthiness defense" and reports that every
jurisdiction recognizing the private facts tort allows the defense. Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 300
n.34. Determining what is and is not newsworthy, however, is an inherently subjective task. See
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451
(3d Cir. 1958); Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Cos., 300 Or. 452, 461, 712 P.2d 803, 809 (1986)
(en bane).
62. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
63. Id. at 387-88.
64. Id. at 393. The play actually was based on several hostage events, but a Life magazine
reporter-who had accurate reports of plaintiffs' ordeal in his files- arTanged for photographs at the
family's residence to illustrate a feature article about the play. Id. at 391-93.
65. Id. at 378.
66. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
67. Id. at 279-80 (sheriff who sued newspaper for defaming him in a political advertisement
held to actual malice standard). "Actual malice" is a legal term of art distinct from common-law
malice-the ill will or wanton disregard of another's rights that usually is necessary to obtain puni-
tive damages. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974).
68. Time, 385 U.S. at 388.
69. Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
70. Id. at 389.
71. Id. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
72. Id. at 398 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black was joined in his concurrence by Justice
Douglas. Id.
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and fourteenth amendment rights to privacy against government. 73
Since the Time decision, the Supreme Court has established various levels
of first amendment protection for false defamatory speech. The Court has ex-
tended or contracted the scope of constitutional protection depending primarily
upon two factors: whether the plaintiff is a private or public individual, and
whether the speech at issue is of only private concern, as opposed to being of
public concern as well. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.74 the Court ruled that a
private person could maintain a libel claim for the publication of a false defama-
tory magazine article by showing some fault, if not necessarily the knowledge or
reckless disregard of falsity a public official or a public figure must show.75 The
Court explained that states have a more compelling interest in compensating
private individuals who have not assumed the risks of public life and who lack
access to media to counteract defamatory speech.7 6 The Court, however, did
limit private plaintiffs to compensatory damages on a mere negligence
showing. 7
7
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.78 the Court went
beyond Gertz, holding that both presumed and punitive damages for false defam-
atory speech could be awarded without proof of actual malice when speech was
of private concern only.79 The Dun & Bradstreet Court found that the state
interest in compensating private individuals for defamation was more compel-
ling than "the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of
public concern." 80 The Court offered a vague formula for distinguishing speech
of public concern from speech of private concern by considering "'content,
form, and context.., as revealed by the whole record.' "81
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HIepps82 the Court held that a private
person alleging defamation by false statements about a matter of public concern
should bear the burden of proving falsity, contrary to the common-law presump-
tion of falsity.8 3 Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority: "In a case presenting
73. Id. at 414 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
Justice Fortas was joined in his Time dissent by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark.
74. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
75. Id. at 347. The Gertz Court reserved judgment on whether its decision would control false
light privacy cases and therefore displace the Time decision. Id. at 348.
76. Id. at 344-45.
77. Id. at 349.
78. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
79. Id. at 763. The Dun & Bradstreet Court upheld a punitive damage award for a construc-
tion contractor who was reported inaccurately to have filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 751-52. The
report was made only to five confidential subscribers of the defendant credit reporting agency. Id. at
751. The Court described the speech at issue as "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and
its specific business audience." Id. at 762.
80. Id. at 761. Dun & Bradstreet was a plurality decision, authored by Justice Powell and
joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White separately con-
curred with the plurality's distinction between private and public concern. Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 774 (White, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
82. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
83. Id. at 776-77. Hepps concerned a private businessman who claimed he was defamed by
false newspaper reports linking him to organized crime and government corruption. Id. at 769-71.
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a configuration of speech and plaintiff like the one we face here, and where the
scales are in such an uncertain balance ... we believe that the Constitution
requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech."'8 4
The Supreme Court has only narrowly addressed the issue whether truthful
publication invading a privacy interest can be subject to suit consistent with the
first amendment. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 85 the Court held that a
television news broadcast of a rape victim's name obtained from public court
records could not give rise to liability for invasion of privacy by publication of
private facts. 86 The majority noted that in the past the Court had "carefully left
open the question whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that
truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought by a private
person as distinguished from a public official or public figure."' 87 The Court
noted further that while it previously had protected criticism of a public official's
conduct because "'the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger
public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth,'" it
also had recognized that "'different interests may be involved where purely pri-
vate libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned.' "88 The Court
found both privacy and free press "plainly rooted in the traditions and signifi-
cant concerns of our society."8 9 Accordingly, the Court declared, "Because the
gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true
or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an
individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitu-
tional freedoms of speech and press." 90 The Court expressly declined to address
"the broader question whether truthful publication may ever be subjected to
civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 9' Instead, the Court limited its holding to bar state sanctions for the
publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to
public inspection. 92
Since Cox, the Supreme Court has yet to tackle the broader question
whether truth is always a defense to private facts claims. In Florida Star v.
B.J.F., a decision handed down earlier this year, the Court extended immunity
to the publication of government records lawfully obtained outside the court-
room, overturning a damage award to a rape victim whose name was published
from a police report.93 The Court, however, declined to decide whether the
84. Id. at 776.
85. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
86. Id. at 491. The crime victim in Cox had been raped and murdered; plaintiff was her father.
Id. at 472-74.
87. Id. at 490.
88. Id. at 490-91 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
89. Id. at 491.
90. Id. at 489.
91. Id. at 491.
92. Id. at 495. Justice Powell, in a lone concurrence, interpreted the fault standard of Gertz to
imply "the constitutional necessity of recognizing a defense of truth." Id. at 499 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
93. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 57 U.S.L.W. 4816, 4820 (U.S. June 21, 1989). The court acknowl-
edged that the case before it was not controlled by Cox, because the rape victim's name was only
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Constitution protects all truthful publication of private facts lawfully obtained
from public and private sources.94
In addition to the private facts tort, the Supreme Court has also left in
constitutional limbo the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when
the intentional act is truthful speech about a private person.95 The emotional
distress tort imposes liability for extreme and outrageous conduct intended to
cause, and which in fact causes, severe emotional distress. 96 In Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwel 9 7 the Court held that political satire at the expense of a public
figure could not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
without additional proof that the publication contained a false statement of fact
made with actual malice.9 8 The Court held that the tort's intent and outrageous
behavior elements would not safeguard free speech and press sufficiently "in the
world of debate about public affairs." 99 The Court's criticism of applying an
outrageousness standard in the context of harmful speech resembled its previous
condemnation of presumed and punitive damages in libel:
"Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
inadvertently released by police and was not supposed to be in the public record. Id. at 4818. The
Court, however, relied on Cox and on other decisions, particulary Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979), in which the Court held that a newspaper could not be criminally
punished for publishing an alleged juvenile offender's name obtained from witnesses, police, and a
prosecutor. Florida Star, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4818 (also citing Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, 420 U.S. 308 (1977) (invalidating restraint on media publication of juvenile defendant's pho-
tograph) and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (protecting
newspaper report about state panel's confidential review of judge)).
94. Id. at 4818. Justice Marshall wrote for the majority: "We continue to believe that the
sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between the First Amendment and
privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate
context of the instant case." Id. His final conclusion leaves room to protect the publication of
private facts lawfully obtained from private sources: "We hold only that where a newspaper pub-
lishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may be lawfully imposed, if at
all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order . I... d  at 1420. Although
the Court noted the public significance of the rape report in its decision, id. at 4819, it did not state
clearly whether that factor is a prerequisite for constitutional protection. Because the Florida Star
decision was handed down in the final stages of this publication, this Note cannot more thoroughly
discuss the case.
95. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 11.01 (1986).
96. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1965). The exact definition of these elements
differs among the states. For example, the Virginia statute at issue in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
108 S. Ct. 876 (1988), allowed liability for reckless infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 879 n.3.
97. 108 S. Ct. 876.
98. Id. at 882. The satire was an ad parody titled "Jerry Falwell talks about his first time,"
which portrayed the television minister in a drunken, incestuous encounter with his mother in an
outhouse. Id. at 878. A disclaimer at the bottom of the page described it as "ad parody-not to be
taken seriously." Id. Falwell sued both for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
libel claim failed because the jury found that the parody could not have been reasonably believed to
be actual fact. Id.
99. Id. at 880. The Hustler Court recalled an earlier decision in which it protected even ill-
willed criticism of a public official:
"Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will
be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utter-
ances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of
truth."
Id. at 880-81 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
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basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageousness"
standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience.' ° °
The Hustler Court concluded that public officials and public figures could not
recover for emotionally harmful speech short of libel "committed with actual
malice.' 0 1 It did not, however, suggest how it might decide a similar claim by a
private person.
Given the Supreme Court's narrow and sharply divided decisions on the
extent of constitutional protection for speech that hurts private individuals, it is
not surprising that lower federal and state courts do not follow any uniform rule
when deciding private facts cases. Some courts have disregarded the first
amendment totally;10 2 other courts carefully have balanced privacy and free
press concerns to accommodate the Constitution as well as common-law tort
theory. 10 3
Recently the South Carolina Supreme Court failed to mention the first
amendment at all on facts resembling those in Hall. Hawkins v. Multimedia,
Inc. 104 arose from a feature article concerning teenage pregnancy.' 0 5 The article
identified plaintiff as the teenage father of an illegitimate child and contrasted his
views on the birth with those of the child's teenage mother.'0 6 A jury awarded
plaintiff $1500 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages for invasion
of privacy by publication of private facts.10 7 The South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the judgment, finding the issue whether the facts reported were of
public interest a question of fact for the jury.10 8 The court previously had af-
firmed the dismissal of a private facts claim because the birth of a baby to a
twelve-year-old girl was held to be a "biological occurrence which would natu-
rally excite public interest."' 1 9 In Hawkins the court distinguished its earlier
holding, emphasizing that "[p]ublic or general interest does not mean mere curi-
osity, and newsworthiness is not necessarily the test."' 10
The notion that newsworthiness is not always an absolute defense
originated in 1940 in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.," decided by the United
100. Id. at 882; cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (limiting the availabil-
ity of presumed damages to avoid "invit[ing] juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to
compensate individuals for injury").
101. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
102. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 104-10.
103. See cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 117-32.
104. 288 S.C. 569, 344 S.E.2d 145, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986).
105. Compare the facts of Hall supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
106. Hawkins, 288 S.C. at 570, 344 S.E.2d at 146. Plaintiff had been contacted by a reporter over
the phone and reluctantly answered questions for a few minutes before ending the conversation. The
reporter did not explicitly ask the teenager for his consent to be identified or quoted in the article.
Id. at 571, 344 S.E.2d at 146.
107. Id. at 570, 344 S.E.2d at 146.
108. Id. at 571-72, 344 S.E.2d at 146. Contra Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)
(question whether speech is of public or private concern is one of law, not fact).
109. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 338, 95 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1956).
110. Hawkins, 288 S.C. at 571, 344 S.E.2d at 146.
111. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. William Sidis, a child prodigy
who had lectured to mathematicians on the fourth dimension at age eleven and
graduated from Harvard at sixteen, thereafter shunned publicity and withdrawn
from public life.1 12 More than twenty years after Sidis secluded himself, the
New Yorker magazine published a profile of him, describing his "chosen career
as an insignificant clerk" and "the bizarre ways in which his genius flow-
ered."' 13 The court held that the details of Sidis' life were still 6f legitimate
interest because of his earlier fame, but suggested that some private facts of in-
terest could be so intimate "as to outrage the community's notions of decency"
and therefore exceed the scope of legitimate public concern. 1 14 This distinction
between facts of legitimate public interest and intimately private facts gained
potentially constitutional magnitude when the United States Supreme Court in
Time, Inc. v. Hill quoted Sidis,115 and ultimately reserved a decision on whether
such intimate facts would be protected by the first amendment.'
16
Following the Time decision, and thirty-five years after the Sidis decision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Virgil v. Time,
Inc. 117 acknowledged that newsworthiness or public concern is an issue of "con-
stitutional dimension."' 1 8 The Virgil court nevertheless held that the Restate-
ment standards for determining which speech is not within legitimate public
concern, including the Restatement's "community mores" test, did not offend
the first amendment. 19 The court held that while the main theme of a maga-
zine article about body surfing was of legitimate public concern, "it does not
necessarily follow that it is in the public interest to know private facts about the
persons who engage in that activity."' 120 On remand, the trial court found the
publication was of public concern based on "a rational and at least arguably
close relationship between the facts revealed and the activity to be explained."
1 2 1
Subsequent state court decisions have employed similar analyses producing
widely ranging results. The decisions depend, not simply on the facts of each
case, but also on how broadly or narrowly a court defines "rational
relationship."' 122
112. Id. at 807.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 809.
115. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967).
116. Id.
117. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
118. Id. at 1129.
119. Id. For a discussion of the Restatement standards, see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying
text.
120. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1131. The private facts at issue in Virgil described an accomplished
body surfer's strange behavior, including diving down a flight of stairs to impress "chicks," dropping
loads of lumber on himself to collect worker's compensation so he could afford to spend time surfing,
and eating spiders. Id. at 1124 n.1. The court remanded the case to the lower court for reconsidera-
tion of summary judgment for defendant. Id. at 1132.
121. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
122. A plurality of the Iowa Supreme Court in Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.,
283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980), held that the name and description
of a mental patient who was sterilized in a county home because a psychiatrist felt she was "impul-
sive and hair triggered" were newsworthy facts not so intimate that they were not of legitimate
public concern. Id. at 292, 300-01. The plurality reasoned that using the patient's name "offered a
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A recent decision demonstrating great deference toward free speech protec-
tions without barring the private facts tort altogether is Anderson v. Fisher
Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,123 handed down by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1986.
Plaintiff Anderson was an automobile accident victim filmed by a television
cameraman while receiving medical treatment.124 The court unanimously held
that the publication of private facts, even those that might not be considered
newsworthy, would not give rise to liability "unless the manner or purpose of
defendant's conduct is wrongful in some respect apart from causing the plain-
tiff's hurt feelings."'12 5
Justice Linde, writing for the unanimous court, cited federal and state con-
stitutional concerns with the private facts tort but avoided that issue by holding
that the facts before the court did not establish a claim for relief. 126 The court
nevertheless criticized the private facts tort's threat to free speech. It noted that
the element of widespread publicity "singles out the print, film, and broadcast
media for legal restraints that will not be applied to gossipmongers in neighbor-
hood taverns or card parties, to letter writers or telephone tattlers."' 127 The
personalized frame of reference" and "lent specificity and credibility to the report." Id. at 303, A
majority of the court did not find the public concern issue dispositive, however, but rather held that
the facts were taken from a public record and therefore were protected under Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn. Howard, 283 N.W.2d at 302; see supra text accompanying notes 85-94 (discussion of
Cox).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co.,
665 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1981), held that a newspaper article disclosing the psychiatric and
marital problems of an anesthesiologist accused of malpractice was not a tortious invasion of pri-
vacy. Id. The court reasoned that the facts were "connected to the newsworthy topic by the rational
inference that plaintiff's personal problems were the underlying cause of the acts of alleged malprac-
tice." Id. The court concluded that the "generous breathing space" accorded the press meant "edi-
tors must have freedom to make reasonable judgments and to draw one inference where others also
reasonably could be drawn." Id.
, Some state courts have taken a narrower view of what news is of public concern, particularly
when private facts appear in features articles rather than in "hard" news columns. The Mississippi
Supreme Court in Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471 (Miss. 1976), held that
a private facts claim could be maintained against a newspaper that published an article identifying
and describing children in a public school special education class as "retarded." Id. at 474. The
court distinguished the legitimate public interest in the education of mentally retarded children from
the publication of the names and photographs of plaintiff's children. Id. In contrast, the New
Mexico Supreme Court in McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 530 P.2d 804 (N.M. 1975),
held that the publication of names and addresses of private citizens participating in newsworthy
events was necessary to assure proper identification and to avoid confusion. Id. at 809.
Rarely has a court decided that the entire subject matter of a publication is not of legitimate
public concern. In Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964), the
Alabama Supreme Court upheld ajury verdict for invasion ofprivacy when a newspaper published a
photograph of a housewife whose skirt was blown above her waist when she exited a "fun house" at
a county fair. Id. at 381, 162 So. 2d at 478. Even though the woman's body was not completely
exposed, the court viewed the photograph as "obscene... 'offensive to modesty or decency.'" Id. at
381, 162 So. 2d at 479 (quoting Holcombe v. State, 5 Ga. App. 47, 50, 62 S.E. 647, 648 (1908)).
123. 300 Or. 452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986) (en bane).
124. Id. at 454, 712 P.2d at 804.
125. Id. at 469, 712 P.2d at 814. An independent wrong would include conduct seeking emo-
tional distress as its very object or as a means to another end, or publicity that violated a duty owed
to the plaintiff based on a special relationship. Id. An action might also be sustained, the court
advised, when publicized information was obtained by conversion, bribery, false pretenses, or
trespassory intrusion. Id.
126. Id. at 459, 712 P.2d at 806.
127. Id. at 462, 712 P.2d at 809; see also Florida Star v. B.LF., 57 U.S.L.W. 4816, 4820-21 (U.S.
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court distinguished noncommercial use of a person's name from commercial use,
suggesting that the respective interests invaded and motives of the publishers
"should bear on the remedy."128 The court concluded that publishing plaintiff's
photograph was not commercial appropriation "simply because the [television]
medium itself is operated for profit."' 29 The court also noted the difficulty in
discerning which facts are private and which are not. "What is 'private' so as to
make its publication offensive likely differs among communities, between genera-
tions, and among ethnic, religious, or other social groups, as well as among indi-
viduals .... [O]ne reader's or viewer's 'news' is another's tedium or trivia." 130
Courts in three states other than North Carolina have declined to recognize
the private facts tort, although none has gone so far as to reject the tort regard-
less of the facts of any case and without at least purported deference to the
legislature.13 1 Among those decisions, only one addresses the first amendment
issue, expressing "serious concern that, by sidestepping the safeguards which
restrain the reach of traditional public defamation litigation, a [privacy claim]
could compromise the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press." 132
North Carolina historically has protected free press to a greater degree than
other states. The state's original constitution protected freedom of the press but
did not mention other speech. 133 North Carolina stands apart from the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts by denying relief to plaintiffs suing for libel per quod-
June 21, 1989) (criticizing as unevenhanded and underinclusive a Florida statute prohibiting publi-
cation of rape victims' names by any "instrument of mass communication").
128. Anderson, 300 Or. at 466, 712 P.2d at 811-12.
129. Id. at 467, 712 P.2d at 812. The United States Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572-75 (1976), explained in detail the differences between
commercial appropriation and invasion of privacy by publication of private facts. The Court noted
that newspaper reports are not considered commercial speech merely because the newspaper is sold
or because advertisements subsidize the news. Id. at 574 n. 11 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971)). For a recent survey of New York decisions distinguish-
ing commercial speech from noncommercial speech in the context of privacy claims, see Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
130. Anderson, 300 Or. at 461, 712 P.2d at 809 (footnote omitted); see also Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("one man's amusement teaches another's doctrine"); Jenkins v. Dell Pub-
lishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3rd Cir. 1958) ("once the character of an item as news is established,
it is neither feasible nor desirable for a court to make a distinction between news for information and
news for entertainment").
131. See Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 525, 73 N.W.2d 803, 806 (1955) (court
deferred to legislature to decide whether a private facts claim should be recognized); Arrington v.
New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 442, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1323, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 945 (1982)
(assuming privacy action were recognized, publication of plaintiff's photograph in article about mid-
dle class blacks did not support a claim; "an inability to vindicate a personal predeliction for greater
privacy may be part of the price every person must be prepared to pay for a society in which infor-
mation and opinion flow freely"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Donahue v. Warner Bros.
Pictures Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 263-66, 272 P.2d 177, 184 (1954) (declining to extend statu-
tory provision for commercial misappropriation to allow claim of misapropriation of plaintiff enter-
tainer's life story in a movie). The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the privacy tort in Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909), but that decision was superseded by a statute granting a
cause of action for all four branches of the privacy tort. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1985).
132. Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 442, 434 N.E.2d at 1323, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
133. N.C. CONST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights § 15, reprinted in NORTH CAROLINA Gov-
ERNMENT: 1585-1974 810 (J. Cheney ed. 1975); see Martin, Freedom of Speech in North Carolina
Prior to Gitlow v. New York With a Forward Glance Thereafter, 4 CAMPBELL L. REV. 243, 246-47
(1982) (explaining free speech provisions of early North Carolina government documents).
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libel in which defamation is apparent only by reference to extrinsic facts-in the
absence of actual pecuniary loss arising from the publication.13 4 When false
speech has two potential meanings, one defamatory and one not, North Carolina
courts require the plaintiff to prove that defendant intended the defamatory
meaning and that the speech was so understood by the audience.' 3 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized a claim of commercial ap-
propriation in 1938,136 but since has not recognized another branch of the pri-
vacy tort. 137 The court rejected the false light privacy tort in Renwick v. News &
Observer Publishing Co.,138 declining "to add to the tension already existing be-
tween the First Amendment and the law of torts."' 3 9 The false light tort, the
court explained, would "either duplicate an existing right of recovery for libel or
slander or involve a good deal of overlapping with such rights."' 140 Justice
Mitchell, writing for the Renwick majority, observed that, in contrast to the
"yellow journalism" of the late nineteenth century, 'journalists simply are more
responsible and professional today."' 14 1 In support of the court's decision,
Mitchell quoted James Madison:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything,
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.
It has accordingly been decided... that it is better to leave a few
of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning
them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits.142
Justice Mitchell reasoned that in addition to threatening free speech and press,
the false light tort would reduce judicial efficiency by requiring courts to con-
134. See Stutts v. Duke Power Co., 47 N.C. App. 76, 82, 266 S.E.2d 861, 865 (1980); cf. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 comment b (1977) (abandons libel per se, libel per quod
distinction in light of actual malice standard).
135. Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 316-17, 312 S.E.2d 405, 408,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
136. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 792-93, 195 S.E. 55, 64 (1938) (allowing
claim against newspaper that published plaintiff's photograph in a bread advertisement without her
consent, inaccurately identifying her as a vaudeville dancer).
137. The supreme court has not yet addressed one branch, invasion of privacy by physical intru-
sion. But see Morrow v. Kings Dep't Stores, 57 N.C. App. 13, 23, 290 S.E.2d 732, 738 (1982)
(invasion of privacy claim failed where plaintiff alleged that store employee removed a shirt from her
bag, but failed to allege that the shirt was taken without consent or in an illegal search).
138. 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984). In Renwick a newspaper
editorial attributed an erroneous factual statement to plaintiff, a university dean, and the editorial
noted that the statement was contradicted by statements from other sources. Id. at 314-15, 312
S.E.2d at 407. Plaintiff also brought a libel claim based on the editorial, but the supreme court found
the facts did not establish libel. Id. at 316-20, 312 S.E.2d at 408-10.
139. Id. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412.
140. Id. The majority noted that the false light and private facts branches of the privacy tort had
been identified by Professor Prosser as falling within constitutional protection. Id. at 324-25, 312
S.E.2d at 413 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 118 (4th ed. 1971)).
141. Id. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413 (noting that "nothing in the first amendment mandates that
members of the news media be responsible or professional"). But cf. Zuckerman, Knocking on
Death's Door, TIME, Feb. 27, 1989, at 49 (describing the effect on decedents' families when journal-
ists insensitively report death details).
142. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 324, 312 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)). Part of this passage also was quoted by the Supreme Court in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
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sider two nearly identical claims for the same injurious publication. 14 3 Like
Hall,144 Renwick granted more protection to the press than did the United
States Supreme Court, which recognized the tort of false light in Time, Inc. v.
Hill.145
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, sometimes used as an
alternative to the private facts tort, has allowed redress for truthful but mali-
cious publication of private facts in North Carolina. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals in Woodruff v. Miller 146 upheld a jury verdict of $20,001 for a public
school superintendent who was humiliated, lost sleep, and suffered other physi-
cal ailments after his thirty-year-old criminal conviction for aiding and abetting
a service station break-in was posted beside "wanted" posters in the local post
office and circulated in the local community by a personal adversary. 147 The
court cited defendant's "consuming animus against the plaintiff" 148 in determin-
ing that the publication was "a calculated, persistent plan to disturb, humiliate,
harass, and ruin plaintiff for no purpose but defendant's own spiteful satisfac-
tion." 149 The court held that the evidence established the requisite elements of
the emotional distress tort: extreme and outrageous conduct, intended to cause
severe emotional distress, and in fact causing severe emotional distress.15 0 Be-
cause Woodruff was a public official, the court of appeals' decision probably is
no longer valid after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell.151 The emotional distress claim nevertheless may be avail-
able to a private person, as Justice Mitchell suggested in Hall.
1 52
In refusing to recognize invasion of privacy by the truthful publication of
private facts, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Hall maintained the state's
policy of protecting free press even more than may be constitutionally re-
quired. 153 The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide what first amend-
143. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
145. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). For a discussion of Time, see supra notes 62-73 and accompanying
text. In Renwick Justices Meyer and Frye dissented, arguing that North Carolina should recognize
the false light privacy tort. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 328-30, 312 S.E.2d at 414-15 (Meyer, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 331, 312 S.E.2d at 416 (Frye, J., dissenting).
146. 64 N.C. App. 364, 307 S.E.2d 176 (1983).
147. Id. at 365-66, 307 S.E.2d at 177-78 (reversing trial court's judgment notwithstanding the
verdict).
148. Id. at 366, 307 S.E.2d at 178. Defendant was angry over two "bitterly contested lawsuits
over a property dispute" between plaintiff and him that defendant had lost. Id. at 365, 307 S.E.2d at
177.
149. Id. at 365-66, 307 S.E.2d at 178.
150. Id. In contrast to Woodruff, the court of appeals in Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 672,
327 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 114, 332 S.E.2d 479 (1985), found that a magazine article did
not meet the legal standard of extreme or outrageous conduct because the article was "honest, sin-
cere, and sensitive." Id. at 677, 327 S.E.2d at 312. The article described plaintiff's deceased son as a
heavy drinker, a "pain in the ass," and "the only friend I had who would dive on the hood of a car."
Id. at 673-75, 327 S.E.2d at 309-10.
151. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988) (holding that absent a showing of falsity and actual malice, first
amendment precluded intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for speech concerning a pub-
lic figure) (discussed supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
153. Defendants argued that the North Carolina Constitution provides "at least as broad" a free
speech guarantee as the United States Constitution. Defendant's Brief at 10 n.6 (emphasis omitted).
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ment protection is due truthful publication of private facts not found in public
records. The Supreme Court's decisions in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.,154 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,155 and Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell15 6 suggest that the high court may accord relatively little first
amendment protection to speech of private concern that hurts only private indi-
viduals. Not one of the foregoing three cases, however, concerned true speech.
The Court's strong statements supporting the promotion of truth suggest that
true speech ultimately should prevail. 157 The sharp divisions in many cases pre-
vents any confident prediction for the future of this constitutional issue. With-
out guidance to the contrary, the North Carolina Supreme Court was wise to
err, if at all, on the side of drawing too wide a scope of first amendment
protection.
The Hall decision necessarily precludes potential claims by genuinely hurt
people, a consequence the court should have acknowledged. Disparity between
the protection allowed by law and the potential for actual harm is not new to
first amendment cases.158 The constitutional provision for freedom of the press
far outweighs the state's interest in compensating tort plaintiffs, particularly
when truthful speech is involved. The balance in favor of free press and speech
becomes clear when one considers the benefits and costs of the private facts tort.
The private facts tort is so narrowly defined that it benefits relatively few
people. A plaintiff should win a private facts claim only if private facts have
been published about him that a reasonable person would find offensive, and
only if the facts disseminated to the general public are deemed not of public
The court, however, did not address the issue whether the private facts tort violates the state consti-
tution. Cf. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988) (fourth amendment of state consti-
tution requires exclusionary rule even in some circumstances in which federal constitution does not
require exclusionary rule).
154. 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing Dun &
Bradstreet).
155. 475 U.S. 767 (1986); see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing Hepps).
156. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988); see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing Hustler).
157. See, e-g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 770 (White, J., concurring) ("The press must ... be
privileged to spread false information, even though that information has negative First Amendment
value and is severely damaging to reputation, in order to encourage the full flow of the truth."). The
most famous passages in support of free speech appear to assume the value of truth. See, e.g.,
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas... the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market"); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.) (the first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection"), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
158. As noted by the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill: "Exposure of the self to others in
varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of
press." 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1966); see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(statute prohibiting publication of rape victim's name held unconstitutional when the name was
obtained from a public court record). An example of potentially offensive publication of private
facts that is perfectly legal under Cox is a North Carolina newspaper's coverage of an obscenity trial.
The newspaper published prospective juror's names, occupations, church memberships, and disclo-
sures compelled by the judge in open court of their familiarity with sexually explicit materials. For
Adam and Eve Case: Four Jurors Now Selected, The Alamance News, Mar. 12, 1987, at IA.
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concern. 159 Ironically, in a typical case, the more embarrassing the facts, the
more likely they are to be found to be of public concern, leaving the most ag-
grieved plaintiffs without compensation.
The profound costs of the private facts tort outweigh its marginal benefits.
Plaintiffs continue to file private facts claims that ultimately fail, saddling de-
fendants with legal fees as chilling as any jury verdict.1 60 The publication ele-
ment aims exclusively at the media, directly attacking free press and preventing
the even administration ofjustice. 161 The tort's public concern element, particu-
larly when defined by community mores or standards of decency, also conflicts
with the first amendment by replacing the judgment of editors and publishers
with that of judges and jurors.1 62
By focusing on audience reaction rather than publisher behavior, the com-
munity standard does not correlate to any reasonably certain standard of fore-
seeability or control on the defendant's part. The inherently subjective standard
creates a risk of unequal justice in the same way as do similar tests determining
when speech is obscene and therefore unprotected by the first amendment.1 63
Citizens bring to the jury box varied ideas as to what information is not of legiti-
mate public concern. Furthermore, truthful facts, unlike obscenity, have never
been presumed undeserving of constitutional protection.'" The United States
Supreme Court consistently has assumed the contrary-that truth is an ultimate
goal of the first amendment. 165 The Hall court's assertion that "true statements
... are entitled to no less constitutional protection than that guaranteed false
159. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
160. Time, 385 U.S. at 389 (warning that "[flear of large verdicts in damage suits... [and] even
fear of the expense involved in their defense" can suppress free speech); Smolla, Let the Author
Beware: the Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1983) ("Whether
a suit is settled, won, or lost, the legal fees alone can be chilling.").
161. See supra notes 57 & 127 and accompanying text.
162. In cases concerning individual access to publicity through the media, the Supreme Court
has recognized professional journalists' special privilege of gauging the public interest:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of
material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast--can and do abuse this power is beyond
doubt, but... [c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values. The
presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality
that these risks were evils for which there was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit of
moderation and a sense of responsibility-and civility-on the part of those who exercise
the guaranteed freedoms of expression.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973). A subsequent
private access decision suggests, however, that the Court would allow editors discretion only within
the scope of public concern. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(newspapers' treatment of public issues and public officials is a matter of editorial control).
163. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (two prongs of three-pronged obscenity test
require determination whether an" 'average person applying contemporary community standards'"
would say the work taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest and whether the work "lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 479,
489 (1957))). The subjective and unpredictable nature of obscenity tests are evident from Justice
Stewart's comment: "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
164. Cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (it is "categorically settled ... that obscene material is unpro-
tected by the first amendment").
165. See supra note 157.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
statements"' 166 reflects the fundamental value of truth. The same premise sup-
ports the argument that we should protect true speech with a broad rule shield-
ing even some truth that hurts.
The paternalistic view of Warren and Brandeis 167 quashes not only freedom
of expression, but also freedom of access to materials of varying content. Courts
have long appreciated the healthy diversity of Americans' news appetites and
the media's responsibility to meet public demand.168 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit more than thirty years ago observed:
A large part of the matter which appears in newspapers and news
magazines today is not published or read for the value or importance
of the information it conveys. Some readers are attracted by shocking
news. Others are titillated by sex in the news. Still others are enter-
tained by news which has an incongruous or ironic aspect. Much news
is in various ways amusing and for that reason of special interest to
many people .... This may be a disturbing commentary upon our
civilization, but it is nonetheless a realistic picture of society which
courts shaping new juristic concepts must take into account.1 6 9
Some citizens may wish to spend their leisure time reading only scholarly works
or highly acclaimed literature, but a greater mass of the American public may be
more interested in the features pages of the daily press or tabloids such as The
National Enquirer. As long as the information reported is true and has not been
obtained by tortious or dishonest means, it is difficult to define the publication as
an invasion of privacy undeserving of substantial first amendment protection.170
The Hall court did not decide whether all truthful publication is immune
from tort liability; it expressly left open the possibility of claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. '71 The court's reasoning that the facts of a pri-
vate facts claim might support an emotional distress claim is, however, circular.
The court described the private facts tort as overlapping the emotional distress
166. Hall, 323 N.C. at 266, 372 S.E.2d at 715.
167. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) ("The First Amendment
presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty-and
thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society
as a whole."); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944) (first amendment "rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public").
169. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958). For various commenta-
tors' views on the functions of free speech in society, see M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 1.02 (1984) (discussing the enlightenment function of speech); O'Connor, The Right to
Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MAss. L.Q. 101, 109 (1968) (as immigration and urbanization
changed our once homogeneous society, people began to experience "a desire to know more and
more about the intimate details of the lives, the actions, the habits, the customs, the thoughts, and
the activities of those about them"); Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New
Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L. J. 1519, 1537 n.87 (1987) (survey-
ing discussions of the "enlightenment function" of free speech); Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 332-
337 (surveying sociologists' and anthropologists' historical accounts of the social value of gossip).
170. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("Though government may deny access to information and punish its theft, government
may not prohibit or punish the publication of that information once it falls into the hands of the
press.").
171. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
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tort. It did not acknowledge the likelihood that, because of their similarity, the
latter tort may impinge just as sharply on free press concerns. Intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous behavior intended to
cause severe emotional distress and causing distress in fact. 172 The same level of
intent has been found when a newspaper published a truthful article, not with a
purpose to harm, but nonetheless with knowledge that the publication would
cause extreme emotional harm to the subject of the report.173 Because the emo-
tional distress tort does not depend on whether harmful speech is of public con-
cern, conceivably the most compelling news story would not be protected if its
author were reasonably certain the subject would be emotionally injured by it.174
The same jurors who might find a news story offensive under a private facts
claim could find the defendant's behavior in publishing outrageous under an
emotional distress claim. 175
If truthful publication of private facts is too constitutionally suspect a tort
to be recognized, the publication of true private facts with reckless disregard, or
even with certainty, that severe emotional distress will follow, actually followed
by such harm, should not give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Regardless of which tort label is placed on such facts, adding the
element of intent and replacing the offensiveness and public concern elements of
the private facts claim with the extreme and outrageous behavior element does
not dispel the first amendment concerns that supported the Hall decision.
A compromise that could satisfy the first amendment, while allowing
claims by some victims of emotional distress, would add to the emotional dis-
tress tort an element of ill will when the intentional action in question is truthful
speech. Such a modification would be similar to the Oregon Supreme Court's
order in Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting COS.,176 which limited the private facts
tort to cases showing more than the traditionally required elements. 177 The
emotional distress tort is not directed solely at publishers and, for that reason, is
conceptually less offensive to the first amendment than is the private facts tort.
The proposed element of ill will-the layperson's definition of malice--is one
172. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
173. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983). In Diaz, a private facts case, the California Court of Appeal upheld punitive damages based
on malice analogous to the intent element of an emotional distress claim. Id. at 135-35, 188 Cal.
Rptr. at 773-74. The court found that a newspaper article about plaintiff's transexuality, published
without ill will but with the intent to be humorous and with reasonable certainty that the article
would have a "devastating impact" on plaintiff, would support an inference that the reporter "acted
with the intent to outrage or humiliate" plaintiff. Id. at 134-36, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 773-75.
174. See Hall, 323 N.C. at 269, 372 S.E.2d at 717 (" 'The tort may also exist where a defendant's
actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood that they will cause severe eitional dis-
tress.' ") (quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 452-53, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (198 1)); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment i (1965) (liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress arises when the actor desires, knows, or is substantially certain that her actions will cause
severe emotional distress).
175. See id. § 46 comment d ("Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.").
176. 300 Or. 452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986) (en bane). For a discussion of Anderson, see supra text
accompanying notes 123-30.
177. Anderson, 300 Or. at 469, 712 P.2d at 814.
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that most people understand. The narrower range of its definition would de-
crease the risk of unpredictable results and subjective value judgments by juries.
Even with an element of ill will added, the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress tort may be doomed in the first amendment area following the
Supreme Court's decision in Hustler, which held that ill will would not over-
come the first amendment's protection of public speech about a public figure.178
The Court might refuse to extend the same protection to bar emotional distress
claims by private persons.1 79 Also unknown is whether the Court will prevent
emotional distress claims by private persons who cannot show knowing or reck-
less falsity.
The North Carolina court's discretion to reject the private facts tort on
common-law grounds 180 enabled it to avoid the difficult issue of first amendment
protection for truthful speech. Although the court's reasoning does not antici-
pate similar questions that are likely to arise in the futute, its rule is simple,
definite and, therefore, not subject to dispute. The court has rejected a tort that
through overbreadth and unmanageable application could have caused more
harm than it was intended to prevent. Ultimately the court may have to reach
the same decision about the emotional distress tort when a claim is brought in
the context of true speech. If a future case arises under facts more aggravated
than those in Hall, the court may find its rule difficult to apply. Perhaps the
court will restrict even truthful speech if it is used as a private weapon to hurt
rather than to enlighten. The protection of truthful speech, however, is a policy
that only rarely-if ever-should be compromised. 8' The media must never be
coerced toward self-censorship. At the same time, if the media follow the
court's example in self-restraint by responsibly exercising their role in society,
rules such as that in Hall should not be tested often. 182
Lucy NOBLE INMAN
178. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
179. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72 n.8 (1964) (rule that express malice does not
vitiate truth defense to claim of defamation by a public official does not apply to "purely private
libels" (quoted in Cox, 420 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1975)).
180. See supra text accompanying note 37.
181. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (citing national defense as a potential justification for restricting truthful speech).
182. "It's nice to know that, in North Carolina in 1988, the only restraint on 'invasion of pri-
vacy' is self-restraint. But with that knowledge comes the sobering realization that in confirming our
freedom, the court has laid on us the sole responsibility to use it for good rather than for evil."
Stevens, Hall vs Salisbury Post: Victory for N. Newspapers, N.C. PREss, Nov. 1988, 3, 4.
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